Games of all kinds have heretofore had a common characteristic, namely, they are played by players who are guided by a unitary game conduct controlling theory. Thus, whether in team games such as baseball, football, basketball and the like, or individual games such as chess or checkers, or the host of parlor type games available in today's market, the game players compete against each other using the same set of rules. This approach, of course, has a logical appeal and insures fairness to all players.
In recent years computer technology has been extensively employed to analyze and assist scientists in connection with a wide range of subjects including, to a limited degree, the play of games. To the extent that this technology has heretofore been brought to bear upon game playing, it has largely taken the form of computer analysis. Perhaps the best example of the use of computers in connection with the analysis of games is contained in an article in Saturday Review of Sciences, by Irwin R. Hentzel (April, 1973). This article sets forth a computer analysis of the well known board game sold under the trademark MONOPOLY. From this computer analysis, the probabilities of landing on any individual space on the board as well as the returns to the players as a function of their investment and these probabilities have been analyzed. Similarly, numerous computer programs have been generated for the play of chess games, and competition by chess experts against these problems has been employed as a training and analysis tool.
In the area of parlor games and particularly business related parlor games, many attempts have been made to simulate actual business conditions and practices. While such simulations in game form have met with varying degrees of success, they have also had a common defect, namely, all the players play by the same set of rules. This approach has limited the ability to simulate actual business conditions since in real life the "players" operate under differing rules of conduct.
Typical of some of the prior art board games which simulate various business endeavors are the games set forth in U.S. Pat. Nos. 1,666,788; 2,976,044; 3,163,423; 3,198,521; 3,367,662; 3,565,437; 3,807,739 and 3,850,433. These games range from rather abstract races around a path to business game simulations for the stock market, discount stores, real estate development, and even invention development, protection and promotion. Each of these parlor games, however, is constructed with game apparatus in which the play of the game by all players is under a single uniform set of game conduct determining rules and parameters. Players can elect at these games to do or not do certain things, but all players at least theoretically will have an opportunity to make the same elections.
The disadvantage of having a single game theory under which all players in a game must play can be illustrated by reference to further prior art patents. The first of these patents is U.S. Pat. No. 2,026,082, which discloses the board game sold under the trademark MONOPOLY and my prior U.S. Pat. No. 3,961,795, which sets forth the board game sold under the trademark ANTI-MONOPOLY. The game play with the game apparatus set forth in the MONOPOLY patent simulates the development of real estate and utilities by means of a monopolistic approach or theory. Thus, the return on the money invested is disproportional to the investment once all of a group of properties is acquired. In fact, however, most real estate and business developments today, although admittedly not all, are developed under competitive theories, namely, the return on investment is proportional to the investment. In a monopolistic theory, the monopolist corners a real estate development and charges exhorbitant rents as a result of his monopolistic position. One could vary the play of the game equipment disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 2,026,082 by simply changing the return from a monopolistic return to a competitive or proportional return on an investment. Such a change in the game would allow simulation of the activities of competitors in developing real estate and utilities, but it would still fall short of simulating both competitive and monopolistic practices, which in fact are present in today's market.
With respect to the game of ANTI-MONOPOLY set forth in my prior U.S. Pat. No. 3,961,795, the basic game theory is to win the game by breaking up illegal combinations of business entities such as monopolies, oligopolies, and business trusts. There is, however, a single method or set of parameters which controls the way players can break up these anti-competitive combinations, when in real life there are numerous approaches through the private and public sectors which can be used to challenge such illegal combinations. Each approach has with it attendant risks and benefits, but the game simulation of my prior patent basically employs a single theory which is a mix of private sector and public sector tools and techniques for breaking up these anti-competitive practices.
Additionally, in the "real world" while some "players" are attempting to build fortunes through either competitive or monopolistic practices, other "players" are attempting to eliminate illegal practices. Thus, the simulation of U.S. Pat. No. 2,026,082 and of U.S. Pat. No. 3,961,795 are further limited to opposite sides of the coin. There are not, for example, players who attempt to build fortunes through monopolistic practices while other players are attempting to prevent monopolistic combinations. Such a simultaneous simulation of market practices would be most interesting and much more realistic than either of the games alone.